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0INFORMATION SHARING AND OLIGOPOLY IN AGRICULTURAL
MARKETS: THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE BARGAINING
ASSOCIATIONS
Abstract. We study incentives for information sharing (about uncertain future demand
for ﬁnal output) among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for
farm output. Information sharing always increases expected grower and consumer surplus,
but may reduce expected intermediary proﬁts. Even when expected intermediary proﬁts
increase with information sharing, ﬁrms face a Prisoner’s Dilemma where it is privately
rational for each ﬁrm to withhold information, given that other ﬁrms report truthfully.
This equilibrium can be avoided if ﬁrms’ information reports are veriﬁable, and if ﬁrms
commit to an ex ante contract that forces ex post information revelation. We argue that
agricultural bargaining represents one means to achieve veriﬁability and to implement such
a contract.
Introduction
Many markets for farm output are plausibly characterized by some degree of imperfect
competition. This is certainly true in most fruit and vegetable markets where growers are
numerous, and where intermediation (e.g., processing or shipping/packing) is relatively con-
centrated. Processing or packing cooperatives, and cooperative bargaining among farmers,
may in some instances be institutional responses to these market imperfections. For example,
Sexton (1990) studies the role that processing cooperatives can play in promoting competi-
tive behavior among non-cooperative processors. In the case of farm bargaining, a number of
authors have argued that collective price negotiation by growers can countervail the market
power of intermediaries (e.g., Helmberger and Hoos, 1965; Ladd, 1964). This perspective
emphasizes the eﬀect of cooperation on market structure, and on the transfer of economic
surplus from intermediaries (and possibly consumers) to growers. An alternative view—the
one we explore in this paper—is that bargaining has eﬃciency consequences independent of
changes in market structure.
Brieﬂy, we consider an imperfectly competitive market for farm output where information
sharing among intermediaries (about uncertain future demand for ﬁnal output) potentially
leads to higher expected aggregate surplus. In this context, we show that a bargaining
1association can solve a Prisoner’s Dilemma among intermediary ﬁrms where all parties (ﬁrms,
consumers, and growers) are better oﬀ when information is fully shared, but where each ﬁrm’s
equilibrium strategy is to not reveal its information given that other ﬁrms report truthfully.
The bargaining association serves two roles: First, the association invests costly resources in
veriﬁcation of ﬁrm reports (ﬁrms can choose not to reveal their information, but if they do
reveal, it is impossible to lie); and second, mandatory bargaining provides a mechanism where
all parties commit to reveal their information. Below, we argue that these two functions are
reasonable descriptions of what bargaining associations actually do (among other things),
and that they serve to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma noted above.
In what follows, we begin with a description of bargaining in agricultural markets. We then
develop a model of information sharing in the spirit of work by Vives (1984), Raith (1996),
and Li (1985) (see Vives (1999), Chapter 8 for an excellent summary of this literature),
and demonstrate how mandatory bargaining can lead to eﬃciency gains. The ﬁnal section
concludes and discusses the empirical implications of our model.
Bargaining and Price Discovery in Agricultural Markets
Our intent in this section is not to provide an exhaustive overview of agricultural bargaining,
but rather to point out ways in which descriptions of the institutional features of bargaining
associations seem consistent with the notion that bargaining has eﬃciency consequences
independent of changes in market structure, and, in particular, that bargaining facilitates
price discovery via formalized “information sharing.”
Bargaining occurs primarily in markets for processing fruits and vegetables (Hueth and
Marcoul, 2003). This particular set of markets comprises only a small portion of all agricul-
tural markets, and it is natural to ask why bargaining associations are not more widespread.
If the success of bargaining as an institution hinges on delivering higher prices to growers,
we should perhaps expect to observe bargaining in a larger class of commodities. In this
respect, it is noteworthy that fruit and vegetable processors obtain their output primarily
through forward contracts, so that traditional modes of price discovery are mostly absent.
Moreover, procurement decisions are typically made in the context of uncertainty about the
state of future demand (e.g., prior to planting). To the extent that price negotiations during
2bargaining facilitate industry-wide communication about future demand, bargaining can be
viewed as a sort of indirect price discovery mechanism.
Results and discussion from two studies of farm bargaining seem consistent with this no-
tion. First, in a national survey of processing fruit and vegetable bargaining associations,
Iskow and Sexton (1992) note that “the majority of associations felt their role was not only
to improve the well-being of grower-members, but also to provide services to processors.” Of
the services provided, “increased price stability,” “improved information,” and “improved
price discovery process” were most frequently cited.1 Lacking similar responses from pro-
cessing ﬁrms, it is diﬃcult to know whether, in fact, such services were provided and valued.
Nevertheless, that nearly all respondents viewed price discovery and improved information as
important services provided by their respective associations is certainly consistent with the
hypothesis that an important consequence of farm bargaining is information transmission
among market participants.
Similarly, Bunje (1980) oﬀers a comprehensive description of bargaining in U.S. agricul-
tural markets.2 In summarizing the role of farm bargaining he notes that:
“Bargaining associations can ﬁll the needs of the market as well as the needs of
the individual producer. They can serve a supply coordinating function for the
market and furnish market intelligence for the producer. They can operate as a
price discovery vehicle, establish market prices, and establish uniform terms of
trade that serve the producer and the marketplace.”
While such a quote might be viewed as self-serving coming from a representative of bargaining
associations, it again conveys the idea that, at least in the minds of those who operate
bargaining associations, bargaining is much more than simply “price enhancement.”
Of course, there are many other possible explanations for the relative prominence of bar-
gaining in processing fruit and vegetable markets. For example, Knoeber (1983) notes that
“liquidated damage” (“most-favored customer”) clauses in contracts between bargaining as-
sociations and growers (processors) can mitigate incentives for either party to renege on
1Of the 36 associations sampled, 31 cited increased price stability, 32 cited improved information, and 25
cited improved price discovery. When queried about services oﬀered to growers, only “price negotiation”
and “time and method of payment” were similarly cited by more than 30 associations.
2Ralph Bunje was a leading spokesman and proponent of farm bargaining for over 30 years during his tenure
as manager of the California Canning Peach Association (forward to citation in text above).
3contract terms.3 To the extent that contract reliability is a problem peculiar to process-
ing fruit and vegetable markets, the beneﬁts from third party (i.e., bargaining association)
contract enforcement may be relatively high. Alternatively, it may indeed be the case that
the degree of imperfect competition in these markets is particularly severe. For example,
Iskow and Sexton (1992) note that the four largest ﬁrms handled over 75 percent of total
production in 23 of 34 markets studied.
In any case, it is not our intent in the present paper to empirically identify the primary role
of bargaining in agricultural markets. Indeed, it is entirely possible that bargaining serves
multiple roles. Our more modest goal is to identify and analyze a role for bargaining that
seems to have gone mostly unnoticed in formal analyses of the farm bargaining problem. Im-
portantly, our analysis suggests that bargaining, to the extent that it results in “information
sharing,” is eﬃciency enhancing. This is in contrast to the “price enhancement” hypothesis,
which suggests the possibility of net welfare losses from farm bargaining.
We begin our analysis below by developing an oligopoly model of n ﬁrms who produce
substitute ﬁnal goods, and who obtain their raw farm input from a group of homogeneous
growers represented by an aggregate supply relation. Prior to procurement, each ﬁrm is
uncertain about the true state of future demand, but receives an imperfect signal of demand.
We study private incentives for ﬁrms to share (or pool) their signals, and corresponding
welfare implications. In this context, we interpret the intensive communication that occurs
during the annual bargaining process, and ultimately the setting of a bargained price for
contracted output, as a means of implementing information sharing.
Model
The Setup
There are n ﬁrms who convert farm output into a vector of ﬁnal consumption goods q =
(q1,...,qn), where qi represents the quantity of ﬁnal goods sold by ﬁrm i. For simplicity,
we suppose that each ﬁrm transforms qi into ﬁnal output in Leontief fashion with constant
3For example, suppose a grower and intermediary form a contract for future delivery of produce at some
agreed price (or pricing mechanism). As the delivery date approaches, unanticipated opportunities for
purchase (in the case of the intermediary) or sale (in the case of the grower) of the relevant produce may
arise and thus provide incentives for one or the other party to renege on the original contract.
4marginal cost (normalized to zero), and, moreover, that a single unit of farm output yields a
single unit of ﬁnal output. Thus, for given output price pi(qi,q−i), and farm price r(qi,q−i),
ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are given by Π(qi,q−i) = [pi(q,q−i)−r(qi,q−i)]qi, where q−i represents the n−1
vector of outputs other than i’s. Growers are represented by an aggregate supply function
r = a + bQ, where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi is the aggregate quantity of farm output purchased.4
Final goods are diﬀerentiated and valued by a representative consumer with utility function

















where β > γ > 0, α > 0, and where ε is a normally distributed, aggregate source of uncer-
tainty from the perspective of growers and intermediaries. We suppose that all uninformed
agents believe that ε has mean 0 and variance σε. For a given vector of prices p = (p1,...,pn),
consumers choose quantities to maximize U(q)−
Pn
i=1 piqi, yielding inverse demand schedules
for each ﬁrm’s output given by




The timing of actions in our model is as follows: In period 0, each intermediary ﬁrm
privately receives and independent and costless signal si = ε + νi, where νi is distributed
normally and independently of ε with E[νi] = 0, E[ν2
i ] = σν, E[νiνj] = 0 for i 6= j. Thus,
formally each si represents imperfect, though unbiased, information on the state of future
demand. 5 Informally, we can think of processing ﬁrms, as part of their everyday business
activities, receiving information from their respective retailers about the current state of
demand.6 Based on these signals, ﬁrms form expectations in period 1 about demand in
period 2, and coordinate with growers for delivery of some quantity of farm output that
arrives in period 2. Expectations depend on the information available to each ﬁrm, and we
4This speciﬁcation of the farm sector ignores grower heterogeneity, which may be important in considering
the incentives for growers to form a bargaining association. We would like to consider the industry-wide
incentives to form a bargaining association, independent of the organizational and administrative diﬃculties
created by grower heterogeneity.
5Allowing ﬁrms to have asymmetric and correlated signal technologies (e.g., E[ν2
i ] = σi
ν, and E[νiνj] 6= 0)
would complicate presentation without signiﬁcantly altering our qualitative conclusions. See Vives (1984)
for a treatment along these lines.
6We do not analyze the possibility of costly information acquisition. However, doing so will not aﬀect the
qualitative results of our analysis so long as the cost of information acquisition is contractible.
5consider two scenarios: In the ﬁrst, each ﬁrm keeps its information private, and forms an
expectation based on si (for ﬁrm i). Alternatively, ﬁrms pool their information and form
expectations based on the full vector of signals s = (s1,...,sn). Finally, in period 2, ﬁrms
noncooperatively choose prices to maximize their individual proﬁt, given the quantities of
output arranged for delivery in the previous period. We assume “eﬃcient rationing” (e.g.,
Tirole, 1989) of quantities, so that equilibrium prices in period 2 are just those that form an
equilibrium when all quantities are delivered to the market.
The structure of this market is formally equivalent to Bertrand competition with ﬁrms
choosing capacities in an ex ante period; here “capacities” are given by the quantity of
output arranged for delivery during period 1. For this equivalence to hold, it is, of course,
essential that no ﬁrm have the opportunity to obtain additional output in period 2 (relative
to what was arranged for delivery during period 1). This is a natural feature of the markets
we study, given the time interval required to produce most kinds of farm output.7
Market Equilibrium Without Information Sharing
In period 1, after each ﬁrm receives its signal si, the ﬁrms play a Cournot game in choosing
quantities of output for delivery in period 2. For given qi, the conditional expected proﬁt of
ﬁrm i is given by
(3) Π(qi,q−i|si) =
 






where α = α − a, β = β + b, and γ = γ + b. Let ρ = σε/(σε + σν) represent the correlation
between si and sj. Then ﬁrms update their priors on ε with the formula E[ε|si] = ρsi, which
is a weighted average of the prior and si.
Firm i chooses qi to maximize conditional expected proﬁt, given expectations about ε and
the production decisions of other ﬁrms. For any given strategy used by other ﬁrms (that will
7It is also worth noting that we take as a given each ﬁrm’s desire to coordinate with growers in period 1 (rather
than compete for aggregate output in period 2). This is consistent with the notion that ﬁrms “contract”
with growers, rather than purchase output on some kind of spot market. Understanding why ﬁrms choose
to contract is an interesting problem, but one that lies beyond the scope of this paper. Interestingly, as
noted in the previous section, the absence of spot markets (and the corresponding prevalence of contracted
arrangements) seems to be a necessary condition for the establishment of bargaining associations.
6be conditional on other ﬁrms’ signals), ﬁrm i’s best response is given by
(4) qi(q−i) =





We ﬁnd the equilibrium for this game by supposing that ﬁrms use strategies that are aﬃne
in their signals, and then verify that these strategies indeed form an equilibrium (Radner,
1962). Letting ﬁrm i’s equilibrium strategy be given by qi = c0 + c1si, and noting that
E[sj|si] = ρsi, it is straightforward to verify that an equilibrium is obtained setting c0 = α/δ,
and c1 = ρ/δρ, where δ = 2β +(n−1)γ, and δρ = 2β +(n−1)γρ. The equilibrium quantity










For future reference, we note that E[q
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ρ, for i 6= j.
The full information equilibrium level of production when ε equals its expected value
of zero is given by α/δ, so that ﬁrms increase or decrease their output relative to this
benchmark, depending on whether the realization of si is greater or less than zero. The
variance of signal noise σν has an ambiguous eﬀect on the slope term ρ/δρ. On the one hand,
as σν decreases, ﬁrms put more weight on their signals relative to their prior, and this makes
ﬁrms more responsive to their signals. This eﬀect is reﬂected in the numerator of the second
term in equation (5) where a decrease in σν increases ρ. On the other hand, a decrease
in σν increases the correlation of ﬁrms’ signals. This, in turn, implies that if some ﬁrm,
say ﬁrm i, receives information suggesting high demand, it is likely that other ﬁrms have
received similar information. Because the outputs of each ﬁrm are strategic substitutes, an
equilibrium response to this is a reduction in ﬁrm i’s output. This eﬀect is reﬂected in the
denominator, where a decrease in σν increases δρ. Changes in σε have a similarly ambiguous,
though reciprocal, eﬀect on ﬁrm responsiveness. A reduction in σε lowers the weight placed
on each ﬁrm’s signal, making ﬁrms less responsive, but also reduces the correlation of signals,
and this tends to increase responsiveness.
7Expected proﬁt for each ﬁrm prior to observing their signal si, but anticipating equilibrium








which from (3) and (4) reduces to Πp = βE[(q
p
i)2]. Direct calculation from (5) then yields









The ﬁrst term in this expression represents the proﬁts each ﬁrm would receive if there were
no uncertainty (σε = 0). From this term, expected proﬁts are high when aggregate demand
and supply are high (high α or low a), or when the total price decrease resulting from a small
increase in each ﬁrm’s output is small (low δ). The second term, which is strictly positive
so long as σν is ﬁnite, reﬂects the beneﬁt from receiving a signal, relative to no information
at all.
One consequence of information sharing is an increase in the precision with which ﬁrms
estimate ε. Thus, before considering the market equilibrium with information sharing, it
is instructive to consider how a reduction in the variance of the signal error σν (which
reduces the variance of each ﬁrm’s estimate of ε) aﬀects expected ﬁrm proﬁts when there
is no information sharing. From (7), a reduction in σν has a similar qualitative eﬀect on
proﬁts as on the equilibrium responsiveness of each ﬁrm’s output to their signal (described
above). Firms beneﬁt from a reduction in the variance of signal noise because their output
decision more accurately reﬂects actual demand conditions. In particular, the mean square
error of each ﬁrm’s estimate of ε (given by σεσν/(σε + σν)) falls when σν falls. However,
because the signals of each ﬁrm become more correlated, equilibrium outputs also have
greater correlation, and this tends to reduce expected proﬁts. This ambiguity suggests
that whether or not ﬁrms gain from information sharing will generally depend on a direct
comparison of expected proﬁts in each regime. In the next section, we derive an expression
for expected ﬁrm proﬁts when information is shared, and make this comparison.
8Market Equilibrium With Full Information Sharing
Here, we suppose that some mechanism is available for ﬁrms to share their information.
Later in the paper, we will argue that bargaining can be one such mechanism. To focus
on the potential beneﬁts from information sharing, we continue to assume that ﬁrms act as
oligopsonists in the market for farm output.8
When information sharing occurs, each ﬁrm receives the full vector of signals s, and thus
all ﬁrms form a common estimate of ε. With n independent signals, the best estimate of ε
is given by E[ε|s] = ρns, where ρn = σε/(σε + σν/n), and s is the mean value of the vector
s (DeGroot, 1970). Proceeding as in the previous section, ﬁrm i0s reaction function is then
given by
(8) qi(q−i) =




















Thus, equilibrium expected output is the same, regardless of whether or not ﬁrms share
information on their common demand uncertainty. Firms are more responsive to their ag-








and it is straightforward to verify that this condition is always satisﬁed (for β > γ). In-
formation sharing increases the precision of each ﬁrm’s estimate of ε, and this makes ﬁrms
more responsive to their signals; but information sharing also leads to perfect correlation in
ﬁrms’ strategies, and this makes ﬁrms less responsive to their signals. The satisﬁcation of
the inequality (10) indicates that the net eﬀect of these countervailing forces is always an
increase in ﬁrm responsiveness.
8Bargaining that leads to competitive pricing for farm output would, of course, generate eﬃciency gains, but
we would like to evaluate the beneﬁts from information sharing independent of changes in market structure.
9As in the previous section, expected ﬁrm proﬁts are given by (β times) the expected value
of equilibrium quantity squared. Thus, expected ﬁrm proﬁts with information sharing are
given by








and comparison of proﬁts under each regime reduces to a comparison between the relative
magnitudes of ρn/δ2 and ρ/δ2
ρ.
Welfare Comparison
In this section we evaluate the eﬀect of information sharing on total expected welfare, and
on the expected welfare of ﬁrms, consumers, and growers individually. We evaluate ex ante
welfare (prior to the ﬁrms receiving their signals), but suppose, as in the previous section,
that ﬁrms anticipate the equilibrium outcome in either scenario for a given realization of s.
We begin with the diﬀerence in expected ﬁrm proﬁts with and without information sharing.
It is straightforward (though somewhat tedious) to show that Πs ≥ Πp whenever
(12) 4β(β − γ) − (n − 1)γ
2(1 + nρ) ≥ 0.
The following proposition summarizes the conditions under which information sharing
leads to higher expected ﬁrm proﬁts:
Proposition 1. (Firm Proﬁts) Information sharing increases expected ﬁrm proﬁts when
(i) outputs are highly diﬀerentiated (γ small);
(ii) own demand is relatively inelastic (β large);
(iii) there are few ﬁrms;
(iv) the correlation among ﬁrms’ signals is small (σε small and σν large)
Intuitively, a high degree of product diﬀerentiation is analogous to each ﬁrm acting as
a monopolist in the downstream market for farm output. Improved information on future
demand increases each ﬁrm’s ability to price discriminate, and this in turn increases expected
proﬁtability. Firms similarly gain from information sharing when own demand is suﬃciently
inelastic. When there are a small number of ﬁrms, and when the correlation among ﬁrms’
10signals is relatively weak, correlation among ﬁrms’ strategies is relatively unimportant and
this tends to make information sharing more attractive to ﬁrms.
Surplus for growers is given by 1
2(r(Q) − a)Q = b








i] + (n − 1)E[qiqj]

.
Using the expressions for E[q2
i] and E[qiqj] obtained in the previous sections, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that growers always beneﬁt from information sharing. Intuitively, both grow-
ers and ﬁrms gain from increased precision in estimating aggregate demand. However, the
increase in correlation among ﬁrms’ outputs lowers expected ﬁrm proﬁts, and increases ex-
pected grower surplus. Thus, the two eﬀects associated with information sharing—increased
precision in estimating aggregate demand and increased correlation among ﬁrms’ outputs—
are countervailing with respect to ﬁrm proﬁts, but complementary with respect to grower
surplus.
Consumer surplus is given by U(q)−
Pn
i=1 piqi. Taking expectations (and assuming equi-







i] + (n − 1)γE[qiqj]
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.
Thus, consumers also beneﬁt from the correlation among ﬁrms’ outputs, but only when there
is some degree of product substitutability. As with grower surplus, the eﬀects of information
sharing on consumer surplus tend to complement, though to a lesser degree since E[qiqj] is
weighted by γ < β. Using the expressions for E[q2
i] and E[qiqj] from the previous section,





δ2(β + (n − 1)γρ)
δ2
ρ(β + (n − 1)γ)
.
Because ρ < 1, if information sharing leads to higher expected proﬁts for intermediaries,
then expected consumer surplus also increases. Also, note that when b = 0 this inequality
will always be satisﬁed since then δ = β + (n − 1)γ and δρ = β + (n − 1)γρ. For b > 0,
condition (15) will generally hold, but can be violated. Thus, consumers generally gain
11from information sharing, though we cannot rule out the possibility that expected consumer
surplus falls.
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δ2(3β + (n − 1)γρ)
δ2
ρ(3β + (n − 1)γ)
.
As with expected consumer surplus, total expected surplus increases with information sharing
whenever expected ﬁrm proﬁts increase, but again we cannot rule out the possibility that
expected total surplus falls. In general, however, it seems diﬃcult to violate the inequality
in (17).
The following proposition summarize the eﬀects of information sharing on grower, con-
sumer, and total surplus:
Proposition 2. (Welfare) Information sharing always beneﬁts growers. Expected consumer
and total surplus increase whenever expected ﬁrm proﬁts increase, and may increase even as
expected ﬁrm proﬁts fall.
Because the expressions for changes in expected proﬁt and consumer surplus resulting
from information sharing yield ambiguous results, we evaluate these measures (and expected
grower surplus) for a particular speciﬁcation of our model. We set n = 5, α = 1, β = 0.3,
a = 0, b = 0.1, σε = 0.3, and σν = .1. With this speciﬁcation, we then let γ range from
0 to β and evaluate diﬀerences in expected surplus with and without information sharing.
The results are displayed in Figure 1. When outputs are suﬃciently substitutable, expected
ﬁrm proﬁts fall when information is shared, though by a relatively small amount. Growers
gain most from information sharing when outputs are highly diﬀerentiated. Interestingly,
the change in expected consumer surplus with information sharing is initially increasing with
the degree of product substitutability, then decreasing.
Figure 2 displays the results of a similar comparative static, but where we hold γ constant
at 0.05, and let n range between 2 and 10 ﬁrms. Again, information sharing leads to a








































Figure 1. Diﬀerence in expected surplus with and without information shar-
ing as ﬁrm outputs become increasingly substitutable in consumer preferences.
decrease in expected ﬁrm proﬁts, but now for n suﬃciently large. Information sharing
beneﬁts growers (and to a lesser degree, consumers) by a larger amount, as the number of
ﬁrms increase.
Though not reported, a decrease in b (making supply more elastic for any given quantity of
aggregate output) increases expected consumer surplus with information sharing, and reduces
13expected surplus for growers. In all cases analyzed, expected total surplus increases from
information sharing, and the beneﬁt to ﬁrms is relatively small (and sometimes negative).
It is also noteworthy that growers seem to gain substantially from information sharing,
relative to ﬁrms, thus adding further potential beneﬁt from bargaining beyond what might
be achieved through changes in markets structure (i.e., more competitive pricing of farm
output). We commented brieﬂy on this point earlier, where we stated our assumption that
bargaining leaves market structure unaltered. For example, in the context of our model,
rather than allow ﬁrms to compete a la Cournot, we could allow the bargaining association
to ﬁx some price e r as the price of farm output and let ﬁrms compete at this (ﬁxed) price.
Growers gain further (relative to the information sharing equilibrium) for an appropriately
chosen price, but this would only repeat arguments made in previous analyses regarding the
role of bargaining in countervailing market power.
Finally, one further point: In the context of agricultural markets, supply is an impor-
tant source of uncertainty, in addition to demand. Adding supply uncertainty to our model
changes very little, and even enhances the potential role for a bargaining association, if the
association can collect information about aggregate supply that is unavailable to each ﬁrm
individually. To see this, suppose that r = a + η + bQ, where now η is an aggregate source
of supply uncertainty over which the association and ﬁrms share a common (normal) prior
with E[η] = 0 and E[η2] = ση. If the association receives a signal s0 = η +ω with E[ω] = 0,
E[ω2] = σω, and E[s0si] = 0 for all i, then it is simple to verify that adding s0 to s in the in-
formation sharing regime unambiguously increases expected welfare for all parties, relative to
information sharing without s0. It seems plausible that a bargaining association, through its
communication with all member growers (rather than the growers of a single processor) can
add important information concerning current-period supply conditions, further enhancing
“price discovery.”
Private Incentives To Reveal Information and Implementation
We have seen that information exchange among ﬁrms can lead to a market equilibrium that
Pareto dominates the equilibrium with no information exchange; however, it turns out that
when we examine each ﬁrm’s private incentive to share information, a ﬁrm increases its








































Figure 2. Diﬀerence in expected surplus with and without information shar-
ing as the number of ﬁrms increase.
expected proﬁts by not reporting, given that all other ﬁrms have reported truthfully, and
that reports become public information.9 More formally, suppose that ﬁrms play a two-stage
game where each ﬁrm can truthfully report its signal or report nothing in the ﬁrst stage, and
9If reporting ﬁrms can prohibit nonreporting ﬁrms from receiving information submitted by reporting ﬁrms,
then information sharing may be an equilibrium outcome. For a paper that considers exclusionary informa-
tion sharing of this sort, see Kirby (1988). However, exclusionary information sharing presumes that ﬁrms
15then ﬁrms choose quantities and prices noncooperatively in the second stage, conditional on
equilibrium reports in the ﬁrst stage. The following proposition (adapted from Raith (1996))
summarizes the ﬁrst-stage equilibrium of this game:
Proposition 3. (Information Revelation) In the two-stage game where ﬁrms ﬁrst decide
whether or not to report their signal to other ﬁrms, and then choose quantities and prices
non-cooperatively (conditional on the vector of equilibrium ﬁrst-stage reports), each ﬁrm’s
dominant equilibrium ﬁrst-stage strategy is to not report its signal.
Proof: see Appendix.
In other words, given that all ﬁrms j 6= i report their signals truthfully, ﬁrm i gains by
deviating and reporting nothing. Intuitively, given that all other ﬁrms report their signals,
ﬁrm i obtains the full beneﬁts from increased precision in estimating aggregate demand,
and, by withholding its signal, reduces the correlation among equilibrium outputs. This
unambiguously raises expected proﬁts for ﬁrm i, relative to the equilibrium in which it also
reports its signal.
Thus, ﬁrms potentially face a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which all parties gain from infor-
mation sharing, but equilibrium behavior is to not share. Moreover, as we’ve seen in the
previous section, this equilibrium generally leads to lower expected welfare for consumers
and growers. It is, thus, useful to consider the kinds of institutions that might lead to an
eﬃcient outcome. Vives (1990) and Kirby (1988) suggest that “Trade Associations” are such
an institution in markets where ﬁrms’ outputs are strategic complements. With strategic
complementarity, information sharing unambiguously increases expected ﬁrm proﬁts, and it
is a dominant strategy for ﬁrms to report their information. Thus, by collecting industry-
wide information, and reporting back aggregate statistics, it is argued that these associations
eﬀectively implement an information sharing outcome.
However, even in this example where there is no Prisoner’s Dilemma, implementing the
sharing equilibrium requires a highly detailed information gathering eﬀort by the association.
In particular, we noted earlier that ﬁrms’ reports of their signals must be veriﬁable in the
sense that ﬁrms are unable to misreport their signals (though they can choose to not report
are playing something other than a simultaneous move game at the information reporting stage. In any case,
ﬁrms will reveal some information when choosing quantities, so that full exclusion will never be possible.
16entirely). Ziv (1993) studies information sharing when ﬁrms can strategically distort their
signals, and ﬁnds that ﬁrms will always choose to report nontruthfully. Thus, in practice,
veriﬁability is likely to be a substantial informational barrier, and it is not clear from existing
theoretical work whether trade associations actually overcome this barrier, or whether their
primary service is in other dimensions (e.g., lobbying and promotional activities).
When ﬁrm outputs are strategic substitutes (as in the markets we study), implementation
becomes even more diﬃcult. However, assuming veriﬁability of information reports, there
is a simple solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma noted in Proposition 3. In particular, if
reports can be veriﬁed in the sense described above, then ﬁrms can contractually implement
the information sharing equilibrium. That is, each ﬁrm can formally commit to report its
information, and with an appropriately chosen penalty for nonreporting, all ﬁrms will report
in equilibrium.
A bargaining association can be viewed as an institution that facilitates information among
industry participants. Indeed, the annual price negotiation that occurs with bargaining is an
opportunity for explicit consideration of future supply and demand conditions (perhaps even
the primary activity), and this facilitates veriﬁcation of information reports by individual
ﬁrms. Moreover, the structure of bargaining legislation eﬀectively forces information reve-
lation, since ﬁrms are required to engage in price negotiation under “good faith” bargaining
provisions. Further, we can view the setting of a bargained price as a speciﬁc mechanism for
implementing the information sharing equilibrium represented by equation (9). To see this,
note that the supply price r, given equilibrium strategies for each ﬁrm, is given by
(18) r




Thus, there is a strictly monotonic relationship between the supply price and the relevant
aggregate statistic of ﬁrm reports. As a result, announcing r∗ and letting ﬁrms compete at
this ﬁxed price is equivalent to announcing s and letting ﬁrms compete a la Cournot. We
summarize this result in the following Proposition:
Proposition 4. (Implementation) There exists a unique supply price r∗ that implements the
information sharing equilibrium qs
i for i = 1,...,n.
17Each ﬁrm’s information about downstream demand can thus be transmitted to competing
ﬁrms through input price negotiation with the bargaining association. This result provides
a clear link between information sharing and the traditional role of bargaining associations
in setting an “industry” price, and contrasts with information sharing in the context of a
trade association where there is no clear mechanism for implementation.
Conclusion
We provide a rationale for the existence of bargaining associations in agricultural markets
that is entirely independent of the role they may play in countervailing market power. In mar-
kets with a large proportion of contracted production, and a corresponding absence of spot
markets, traditional modes of price discovery are mostly absent. One possible substitute for
price discovery via markets is direct communication among competing ﬁrms concerning ex-
pected future supply and demand conditions. In the spirit of work by Vives (1984), Li (1985)
and Raith (1996), we model this communication as a Bayesian game among oligopolists in
which each of n ﬁrms receives a signal of future demand, and evaluate the welfare implications
of each ﬁrm sharing its signal with other ﬁrms.
Information sharing tends to beneﬁt consumers and growers, but has ambiguous conse-
quences for expected ﬁrm proﬁts. Information sharing allows ﬁrms to increase the precision
of estimated future demand, but because the signals are positively correlated (a natural
assumption, given the nature of the markets we study), information sharing also tends to
increase the correlation among ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies. In markets where ﬁnal outputs
are substitutes, ﬁrm strategies are strategic substitutes, so that a positive correlation of
strategies reduces expected proﬁt. Thus, the eﬀects of information sharing tend to counter-
vail with respect to expected proﬁts, and complement with respect to consumer and grower
surplus. Even when expected proﬁts for ﬁrms increase as a result of information sharing,
ﬁrms face a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the equilibrium behavior of each ﬁrm is to not
report its information (not reporting when other ﬁrms report reduces the correlation of
strategies, with no eﬀect on the precision of estimated future demand). This equilibrium
can be overcome if ﬁrms form an ex ante contract requiring full information disclosure once
signals have been received. We demonstrate how cooperative bargaining, and in particular
18the setting of an industry price for farm output, represents one means of implementing such
a contract.
Whether bargaining is primarily a mechanism for information exchange and price discov-
ery, or a means for growers to countervail, or possibly even to exercise, market power has
important consequences for the welfare eﬀects of farm bargaining. Though it is not immedi-
ately clear how to go about testing the relative merits of these hypotheses, it is worth noting
that our model encompasses both possibilities. Thus, with appropriate data one could test if
predictions associated with information sharing add explanatory power, relative to a model
based purely on the exercise of market power. Given the nested nature of these hypotheses
in our model, such a test could, in principle, be carried out.
19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3:
To prove this result, we consider an equilibrium where n−k ﬁrms report their private signal
whereas the k remaining ﬁrms do not. In the ﬁrst step, we compute the equilibrium strategies
of a ﬁrm who belongs to the set of non revealing ﬁrms, and we derive the equilibrium expected
proﬁt for this ﬁrm. In the second step, we compute the equilibrium strategies and expected
proﬁt of the same ﬁrm when it reports its signal. Comparing expected proﬁts in the two cases,
we then show that chosing to reveal results in a lower expected proﬁt for any k ∈ {1,2,...,n}.
Step 1: We ﬁrst deﬁne and compute a ﬁrm’s strategy when it belongs to the set of
non revealing ﬁrms. We use the subscript i (resp. j) when referencing nonrevealing (resp.
revealing) ﬁrms. Given the information available when production decisions are made, the

























− γ (n − k)qj
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where a prime is used to indicate nonrevealing ﬁrms other than i. Similarly, the expected




























We suppose that ﬁrms use strategies that are aﬃne in the relevant signals, with the
following form:
qi = C0i + C1i
n−k X
j=1
sj + C2isi (19)































































and using the strategies deﬁned in (19) and (20), we can then derive the ﬁrst order conditions









(n−k+1)σε+σνsi − γ (k − 1)C0i




















































σ1 (σ1 (n − k)(2β − γ) + 2βσ2)
δ [2βσ1 (n − k + 1) + 2βσ2 + γσ1 (k − 1)](σ1 (n − k) + σ2)
C2i =
σ1
2β [σ1 (n − k + 1) + σ2] + γσ1 (k − 1)
,


















































Step 2: Next, we compute the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm when it chooses to not report its
signal. There are now n − k + 1 reporting ﬁrms and k − 1 nonreporting ﬁrms. Using the









(n−k+2)σε+σνsi − γ (k − 2)C0i−














































Again, solving this system for the ﬁve unknown parameters in equations (19) and (20)
yields a new set of equilibrium coeﬃcients. In this case, we are only concerned with the






δ (σ1n − σ1k + σ2 + σ1)
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1 (n − k + 1)
δ2 (σ1 (n − k + 1) + σ2)

.
Finally, it is tedious but fortunately not diﬃcult to show that Πj is strictly smaller than Πi.
In particular, we obtain




It is immediate to verify that the inequality (21) holds for any k ∈ {1,2,...,n}, and therefore
that nonrevelation is a dominant strategy for all ﬁrms. QED.
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